Local and National Ownership in Post-Conflict Liberia: Foreign and Domestic Inside Out? by de Carvalho, Benjamin & Schia, Niels Nagelhus
Local and National Ownership  
in Post-Conflict Liberia
Foreign and Domestic Inside Out?  
Benjamin de Carvalho and Niels Nagelhus Schia
N
orw
egian Institute of International A
ffairs
D
epartm
ent of Security and Conflict M
anagem
ent
Security in Practice 3 · 2011
[NUPI Working Paper 787] 
Publisher: 
Copyright:
Visiting address:
Address:
Internet:
E-mail:
Fax:
Tel:
The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
© Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 2011
Any views expressed in this publication are those of the 
authors. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the 
views of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. 
The text may not be printed in part or in full without the 
permission of the authors.
C.J. Hambros plass 2 d
P.O. Box 8159 Dep. 
NO-0033 Oslo 
Norway
www.nupi.no
info@nupi.no
[+ 47] 22 36 21 82
[+ 47] 22 99 40 00
Benjamin de Carvalho and Niels Nagelhus Schia
Local and National Ownership 
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Summary
The paper takes as its starting point the difficulties encountered in implementing 
policies aimed at fostering local and national ownership in peacekeeping activities. 
Especially important in this respect are training programmes aimed at sensitizing 
people working in peacekeeping operations to the inherent difficulties of local own-
ership in post-conflict environments. The account offered here is an ethnography 
of local ownership in a specific context. Through such accounts, we argue, training 
programmes can go beyond emphasizing the difficulties relating to local ownership, 
and instead emphasize how these can be solved in different contexts, on a case-by-
case basis. By offering an ethnographical account of practices of local ownership in 
Liberian ministries, problematizing the role played by international embedded experts, 
we argue that where you stand may actually depend on where you sit. In a difficult 
post-conflict environment, local ownership in the initial phases may not be possible 
without borrowing capacity from the outside. In the end, the important question 
may be not who does the work, but whose perspectives underlie the policies that are 
adopted and implemented.
The present research was made possible through a grant from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign  
Affairs through the Training for Peace in Africa Progrmme (TfP) www.trainingforpeace.org

Introduction 
The traditional distinction between peacekeeping and peacebuilding is 
no longer tenable, as different tasks have become inherently inter-
woven. With this change, concepts and tools pertaining to the peace-
building agenda – which has traditionally drawn heavily on terms and 
tools from the development field – have become part of UN peace-
keeping. Central here is the emphasis accorded to national legitimacy, 
sought achieved through ‘local’ or ‘national’ ownership. As a way to 
overcome what many have characterized as a legitimacy crisis of UN 
peacekeeping, national ownership has increasingly become the an-
swer. But what does local or national ownership entail, in a setting 
where the distinctions between national authorities and the interna-
tional community are at best blurred? The present report is an attempt 
at understanding what different actors understand as local ownership, 
through an inquiry into practices of ownership in Liberian ministries. 
By means of an ethnographic account, we argue that while local own-
ership may be important, perhaps even more important is the local 
perspective. For, as the literature emphasizes, post-conflict local own-
ership may be not only difficult to achieve, but inherently problematic. 
In many ways, local ownership is why conflicts emerged in the first 
place. The reason why international peacekeeping operations are 
mandated to conflict and post-conflict areas is precisely because the 
local processes have led to violence. As such, the local ownership 
championed by the international community is not local ownership 
tout court but local ownership of a specific kind: the good kind. 
 
The inherently problematic nature of local ownership in post-conflict 
environments is a key feature which should figure centrally in all 
types of training programmes preparing people to work in a peace-
keeping environment. To be sure, local ownership already has a pre-
dominant place in training modules, where the difficulties involved in 
the concept are emphasized time and again. These modules, however, 
often fall short when it comes to providing answers for how to over-
come those difficulties. Besides stating that local ownership is both 
important and difficult, little is offered. 
 
Our aim in the present report is twofold. On the one hand we seek to 
understand how the emphasis on local ownership gets entangled in the 
practice of peacekeeping operations. We employ ethnography as a 
way of providing empirical avenues for further theorizing and studies. 
On the other hand, we offer this emphasis on ethnography as a way 
out of the impasse facing current literature and training modules with 
regard to local ownership. Our underlying argument is that ethno-
graphical accounts and empirical accounts exemplifying how local 
ownership is practiced in peacekeeping missions – emphasizing the 
daily challenges people will meet in these environments and how they 
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often have to be solved on a case to case basis – may be a way for 
training programmes and modules to go beyond the limitations of 
simply stating the inherent problems associated with local ownership. 
Implementing local ownership cannot be successfully done through 
general policies, but may have to be dealt with on a case-by-case ba-
sis. The solution we offer here involves focusing on local perspective 
as a step towards local ownership. 
An Emphasis on Local Ownership 
Faced with a wave of criticism emphasizing the neo-colonial and 
overly Western character of peacekeeping and peacebuilding activi-
ties,1 the UN has come to favour solutions anchored in local or na-
tional processes. Whereas some scholars have argued for the need to 
understand local circumstances when deploying a peacekeeping op-
eration or intervening with peacebuilding activities,2 others have em-
phasised how increased sustainability may be achieved as an effect of 
local actors’ engagement and personal stakes in reconstruction activi-
ties.3 As a case in point, Beatrice Pouligny has dealt with peacebuild-
ers’ conceptual understanding of the term local ownership and sug-
gests that ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ may be a more precise way of dis-
cussing conflicts because the use of local ownership often refers to 
national level rather than local or community level.4 Increasingly, 
however, local or national ownership has become the answer to what 
many scholars perceive as the legitimacy deficit of UN peacekeeping.  
 
To be sure, an emphasis on local and national ownership is nothing 
new in peacebuilding and peacekeeping activities. Originating in de-
velopment work, the term local ownership was employed by the De-
velopment Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) in 1996, in a docu-
ment highlighting the importance of locally-owned development 
strategies (OECD DAC 1996) and defining local people through their 
relation to donors. The DAC report was later followed up by the 
World Bank, UNDP and most NGOs, and became one of the princi-
ples of the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness.  
 
In the recent UN Capstone Doctrine – a document outlining future 
principles and guidelines for UN peacekeeping operations – national 
and local ownership are presented as ‘critical to the successful imple-
mentation of a peace process’ (UN DPKO/DFS 2008: 40). The em-
phasis on local ownership as enhancing the legitimacy of peacekeep-
                                                 
1  See for instance Paris (2002) and Richmond (2009).  
2  See for instance Autessere (2010), Mamdani (2007, 2009), Lederach (1997, 2002) and de 
Waal (2005) who argues that international peacebuilding have been blind for local con-
flict drivers. 
3  Gizelis and Kosek (2005). 
4  Pouligny 2009. 
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ing operations is explicit: ‘Effective approaches to national and local 
ownership not only reinforce the perceived legitimacy of the operation 
and support mandate implementation, they also help to ensure the sus-
tainability of any national capacity once the peacekeeping operation 
has been withdrawn’ (ibid.). But a precondition for national and local 
ownership, UN policy states, is a thorough understanding of the na-
tional context, including ‘the political context, as well as the wider 
socio-economic context’ (ibid.). In short, the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations sees local ownership as crucial to the suc-
cessful implementation, legitimacy and sustainability of a peace proc-
esses. 
 
At the conceptual level, local and national ownership is fairly straight-
forward; in the case presented here, an emphasis on local and national 
ownership in policy is all about who guides policy processes, and 
whose preferences they reflect – the key issue being that the prefer-
ences of Liberians (or ‘locals’) should permeate policies and strate-
gies. In terms of implementation, local and national ownership seems 
equally straightforward. It emphasizes that Liberians themselves (be 
they local NGOs or the Liberian government) should implement pol-
icy. In essence, local and national ownership emphasizes that, what-
ever the policy, it should be formulated by locals or nationals, reflect 
the preferences of locals or nationals, and be put into work through 
local or national institutions. In practice, however, the implementation 
of strategies emphasizing the primacy of local and national ownership 
is a lot messier – as we came to learn in the course of our research. 
 
The emphasis on local ownership as hammered through by the UN 
system and international NGOs is a specific concept which veils the 
substance or the matter of politics. Central questions here include: 
What is it the international community sees as important to have local 
ownership over? Which elements are addressed – and which are ig-
nored? What are the consequences of the UN emphasis on local own-
ership of a given field? Such questions do not figure on the UN 
agenda. To us it seemed that it was precisely when the UN decided 
that there should be local ownership over a given field that local own-
ership over that field vanished. As such, this article argues, the mean-
ing of local and national ownership is not given ex ante, but is intrin-
sic to the set of practices which constitute it.  
Searching for Owners 
As researchers embedded in the peacekeeping community, we take 
various terms and concepts for granted. This often leads us not to 
question their content and practical significance. Amidst the myriads 
of actors in Monrovia, our search for traces of local ownership soon 
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became blurred. What did local ownership really mean? Who were 
these ‘locals’ and what processes did they run? The map did not fit the 
terrain, and we had to rethink our approach. After a quick coffee break 
at one of the many ex-pat hotels in Monrovia, we agreed that a good 
place to find local or national people to talk with about ownership 
would be the various ministries. Our assumption was based upon the 
assumption that where your desk and computer are also determines 
who you are politically, and that people working in the ministries, the 
insiders, would represent the citizens of Liberia – as opposed to for 
instance ex-pats, the outsiders.  
 
We started off by calling the office of a deputy minister we had been 
told would have some interesting views on local ownership. When we 
introduced ourselves over the phone and requested an interview to 
discuss local ownership, we were promptly asked, ‘ownership of 
what?’ To that we had no immediate answer. We realized that as re-
searchers we had been imbued with in a certain understanding of the 
concept of local ownership to the point where we were unable to ar-
ticulate a coherent position on the concept. Ownership of what? ‘Pol-
icy processes’, we replied after a few seconds. ‘Aha’, came the re-
sponse. The minister would not be available.  
 
After numerous phone calls, we realized that our project of under-
standing what Liberian authorities meant by ‘local ownership’ and the 
extent of involvement of the international community in Liberian pol-
icy processes would simply not be feasible. Either those we spoke 
with had no interest in our project, or they were not willing to talk 
about a potentially controversial subject. 
 
As Liberian politicians would not help us understand local ownership, 
and since we therefore seemed unable to get a glimpse at the ‘inside’ 
of Liberian politics, we turned towards the outside: the well-known 
and ‘safe’ world of international NGOs.5 We wanted to know if they 
had any experience with policy processes in Liberian ministries. More 
specifically, we wished to find out who wrote policy documents on 
any specific topic. ‘We can tell you that; it’s the international consult-
ants’, was the answer we got. The NGO officer continued: ‘In a meet-
ing, the Minister of Education admitted that he hadn’t read the policy 
of the ministry because “they hadn’t written it”. It wasn’t written by 
ministry staff.’  
 
The understanding we got of Liberian policy processes was one where 
international experts were largely leading the way. In the Ministry of 
Planning we were told further, ‘UN staff have written most of the pol-
icy.’ In the County Support team, the UNDP had stood for most of the 
                                                 
5  Interview with international NGO, Monrovia. 
Local and National Ownership in Post-Conflict Liberia: Foreign and Domestic Inside Out?  9 
ministry’s policy. The NGO workers we spoke with that day in Mon-
rovia seemed somewhat upset. As they explained to us, ‘Generally, 
they say that they write policy, but it is always written by international 
consultants. And not a word or mention of having received any assis-
tance.’ Rolling their eyes, they told us of a Liberian minister who had 
had the audacity in the press to accuse the international NGOs of be-
ing self-centred, present in Liberia solely for their own benefit, and 
with no impact on the population. The only thing NGOs cared about, 
this minister had asserted, was to ‘put up signboards with their logo’. 
Such accusations clearly did not go down well with the NGO commu-
nity.  
 
International experts in Liberian ministries also seemed to have an 
impact on the funding of the ministry. As we were told further, it was 
the ministries with most international secondments – like as the Minis-
try of Gender and Development and the Ministry of Health – that 
tended to get the most funding. ‘There is nothing more sexy than to 
fund GBV projects’, we were told. There seemed to be a certain in-
fantilizing of the Liberian ministries. We heard of a ministry that had 
managed to secure funding from a US foundation for one of the minis-
try’s own projects. Once the funding had been obtained, the ministry 
was no longer interested in sharing information with the NGOs. This, 
we were told, was problematic, because some ministries were already 
suspected of having received funding from many different donors for 
the same project. Clearly, the NGOs were watching over the shoulders 
of local authorities. ‘The system today is so corrupt’, we were told, 
‘that direct aid to the government would just not work.’ 
 
The NGOs were also central in making the wheels of ministries turn. 
In order for their projects to be able to run, they need to provide prac-
tical assistance to the relevant ministries, including transport and the 
like. We got a clear impression that the NGOs needed to stay on the 
back of the ministries in order to ensure that they delivered their ‘local 
ownership’ at least somewhat in accordance with the plans of the 
NGOs. 
 
Our first interview left us with the clear impression that ‘local owner-
ship’ was a term that conceals the actual content, which is a struggle 
for ownership. In the present case, what the term seemed to conceal 
was that what happened within ministries was precisely the opposite 
of local ownership. The international community seemed to dictate the 
terms, with the ministries playing along in order to receive funding. If 
this is the case, we thought, local ownership can no longer be the an-
swer the UN system needs in order to increase its legitimacy in peace-
building operations.  
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After that first day in Monrovia, we had a clear impression that local 
ownership meant international experts embedded in Liberian minis-
tries, making sure the ministries played the UN tune. But that first day 
also made us want to understand more about the limits of local owner-
ship. If the ministries played along with the UN, and their policies 
were produced largely by international experts, what then was local 
ownership? We had also begun to suspect that the case might not be 
so clear-cut. Liberian ministries, it seemed, did not per se represent 
local ownership. At the same time, they did not represent a global 
governmental scheme. The distinction between local ownership and 
global governance processes, we inferred, must be made somewhere 
within the ministries, through a constant process of demarcation. We 
thus decided to pursue an avenue that we had found by accident a year 
earlier: Mr. Blonde and the Scott Fellows.  
Lost in a Ministry: The Scott Fellowship Programme 
On a previous fieldwork, we had been lost in a ministry. And so, it 
seemed at the time, was everyone else. We had called ahead to set up 
an interview with a deputy minister to talk about a set of issues, but 
now that we had arrived for our appointment, the deputy minister did 
not exist, or he had gone out, or did not work in the ministry, or never 
had done so. Then Mr. Blonde appeared on the scene like a whirlwind, 
and dragged us with him down the stairs. He told everyone they were 
great and were doing a great job, before finding our deputy minister 
(the one we actually wanted to talk to, he said, because the other one 
really didn’t have anything to do with our research). A few comple-
ments later, our new deputy minister had been briefed about the daily 
schedule and been asked to please meet with us because it was very 
important that we talked to someone in the ministry. The person we 
should have spoken with, we soon realized, was not a Liberian minis-
ter, but Mr. Blonde himself. He seemed to hold the ministry together. 
But alas, now he had vanished. 
 
We soon learned that he was not alone in Monrovia, and that there ac-
tually was a large programme designed to ship American top gradu-
ates to Liberia to work in the various ministries, appointed by the Li-
berian president. The name of the programme was the Scott Family 
Liberia Fellows Program. In February 2007 the Center for Global De-
velopment (CGD), a Washington DC-based think-tank, announced the 
new Scott Family Liberia Fellows Program and that it would be sup-
ported by a USD 1 million grant from CGD founder Ed Scott and his 
family. The new programme was to assist Liberia in managing its re-
construction by providing five to six young specialists each year for 
three years to work as special assistants to key government ministers 
and other senior government officials in Liberia. The programme in-
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vited applications from young graduate professionals. Since its start in 
2007, the Scott Program has employed people to work with the Minis-
ter of Finance, Gender, Planning, Health, Education, Public Works, 
Commerce, Agriculture, the office of the President, the Central Bank 
and others. Scott Fellows have been given responsibilities for a variety 
of tasks, but a core objective has been to help ‘key ministers and offi-
cials with designing and implementing high-priority programmes in 
the transition from conflict to reconstruction and development’ (CGD 
2007b). Furthermore, Scott Fellows have been given tasks such as co-
ordinating and communicating within the ministries and agencies, 
across other government agencies and with major international agen-
cies. Their task has been to provide research, analysis and advice on 
policy issues, as well as drafting policy papers and speeches. The idea 
underlying the programme – which emerged as the result of consulta-
tions with Liberian officials at the highest level – is to provide Liberia 
with what is most sorely needed in an interim post-conflict reconstruc-
tion period: namely university graduates to staff high-level advisory 
posts in the ministries. In one word: capacity. In early 2010, the pro-
gramme linked up with the Nike Foundation, and more than 30 Scott 
Fellows had been enrolled. They have been employed through the 
John Snow Inc. Research and Training (JSI R&T), which has coordi-
nated the programme in Monrovia, reporting to the relevant senior 
government official (CGD 2007a). 
 
What had caught our interest was the function these Fellows per-
formed in ministries. How essential were they, and on whose side? 
Were they the embedded agents of a global process of liberal institu-
tionalization, or were they simply doings their jobs as we would have 
expected most Liberian bureaucrats to do? Where did their loyalties 
lie, and what were the implications of these embedded international 
bureaucrats for sovereign political processes in Liberia? What kind of 
policy ownership can national ministries have, we asked ourselves, if 
policy is produced by internationals? The answer, we found, lay in 
neither of these camps, but in-between the two. By virtue of their posi-
tion as insiders from the outside, the Scott Fellows represented the 
boundary between local/national inside on the one hand, and the inter-
national/global outside on the other. By understanding the role and 
function of these Fellows, we thus tried to understand and capture 
where the boundary between inside and outside went, and how it was 
articulated.6 
                                                 
6  See Walker 1992 and Bartelson 1995. 
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Circling Stadiums and Walking Stairs: Some General Re-
marks 
This work relies on the interviews with international Fellows in a 
number of Liberian ministries. We visited many ministries, did not 
always meet with the Fellows, often because we wcould not find them 
or because they simply were not in. In fact, finding our way in the 
maze of ministries was not easy, and we had no access to an overview 
of the relevant Fellows to interview. For instance, one of the minis-
tries proved to be situated within the Samuel Kanyon Doe Stadium 
somewhere below the seat section. Finding our way in the ministry 
took some time, but by circling around the stadium we knew we 
would get there in the end. Other ministries lodge in great buildings of 
the past, where the lifts do not work, and where any newcomer is 
bound to get lost. Given that we often did not even know whom we 
were meeting or where he or she had an office, we were often lost be-
fore we got in. In one case, after having gone up and down, asking for 
the Scott Fellow and getting no satisfactory answer (‘Scott Who?’), 
after being guided from one office to another, and being asked to sit 
down, leave, and to wait, we were finally brought to the innermost 
circle of the maze.  
 
Searching for Fellows in the maze taught us two things. First, Scott 
Fellows were powerful. Time and again we found them by heading for 
the offices in the inner circles of ministries. Second, Scott Fellows 
were not the only international experts in Liberia’s ministries. In the 
some of the ministries, UN agencies even had their own section, with 
a sign and everything – even the type of experts who look at you very 
sceptically when you poke your head inside their office. On one occa-
sion, the Fellow we met was no longer a Scott Fellow, but had moved 
on and was now managing a programme between the Governement of 
Liberia and the UN. His flag was that of the UN, but his colours those 
of a Liberian Ministry. But we did not have the chance to discuss his 
true colours, as he wanted to talk mainly about his time as a Scott Fel-
low. 
Liberian Ministries and International Fellows: A Conflict of 
Interests? 
‘The UN says there is a need for local ownership, but it does some-
thing else’, was the first thing that Mr. Blue told us. He was a Libe-
rian, trained abroad. Throughout the interview, we felt there was a cer-
tain unease when Mr. Blue was describing his position and role. On 
the one hand, he was a Liberian national who had been in Liberia 
throughout large parts of the hostilities, but on the other hand he was 
now partly expat: studied abroad, and now paid by a generous US 
foundation to work in a ministry in his home country. Was Mr. Blue 
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‘local’ or was he an expat? Was he both? Or was he neither? ‘The UN 
structure is untouchable’, he told us. ‘There are lots of untouchables.’ 
While many Liberian would be qualified for various posts within both 
the UN and the NGO community, they are seldom considered.7 The 
problem with emphasizing local ownership in a peacebuilding opera-
tion, we were told, was that post-conflict countries often lack the nec-
essary capacity. As he further explained, UN programmes are run by 
expats. And when the UN leaves, there will have been little impact 
and no transfer of expert knowledge. ‘The UN structure does not 
speak to local ownership.’ Mr. Blue went on to stress the ‘huge dis-
connect between national and expat staff.’ The few locals working for 
the UN, he said, are largely left to their own devices and not mentored 
by anyone. The lack of transfer of knowledge was once again brought 
up. The same applied for NGOs, who leave nothing behind once their 
programmes are over: ‘After the UN and NGOs leave, whose capacity 
have they built?’  
 
Local ownership was not possible as long as there was no local capac-
ity, was the point Mr. Blue hammered through: ‘Local ownership 
means that an NGO has to remain on the ground, but with a local 
country director… But that doesn’t happen.’ 
 
We pushed a bit more on the importance of local ownership, and 
whether working in a Liberian ministry and having his salary paid by 
a US foundation – who obviously have special interests and their own 
priorities – posed conflicts of interests. ‘Sometimes,’ was the answer. 
We thought we were onto something here. If the terms of local owner-
ship are dictated by global foundations, NGOs or the UN, can one 
really speak of local ownership? 
 
We were interested in possible conflicts of interest between local 
ownership and global priorities, between the Ministry of Cisterns and 
the US Foundation, and talked about a joint programme between the 
Foundation and international NGO. A workshop had been organized 
in Monrovia by the programme, and the Fellows were expected to par-
ticipate. However, due to other engagements at the Ministry of Cis-
terns, Mr. Blue had not been able to attend – and the organizers had 
seemed unhappy about this. It was not much of a conflict of interests, 
                                                 
7  One of our interviewees, referred to as ’Tango Papa’ asked us to stress the following con-
siderations after having read through the first draft of our report: ’The UN and Interna-
tional NGOs brought lots of international staff to occupy positions that Liberians are 
qualified for under the pretence that Liberians lack the capacity needed. However, some 
of the “expat” end up learning from the national staff they work with. My personal ex-
perience […] allowed me to work with some “expats” who did not know common com-
puter applications. Because of this, donor funds end up paying for expatriate staff and 
nothing tangible is done on the ground to move the local population from war to recovery. 
Also in terms of salary, national staffs are paid “peanuts” as compared to internationals, 
although it’s the nationals who do most of the actual work.’ The conflict Tango Papa re-
fers to was an underlying theme in our interviews, and is an important reminder worth 
keeping in mind when we discuss the issue below. 
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we thought, but it gave us enough to think we were on the right track. 
We circled more.  
 
A key priority of the Foundation is adolescent girls (‘Investing in the 
girl effect: the most powerful force for change’). It is therefore seen as 
desirable for Fellows to work with issues pertaining to adolescent 
girls. But as Mr. Blue explained, ‘the Ministry’s priority is not adoles-
cent girls, so to speak, but “youth” as generic.’ Mr. Blue could not al-
ways prioritize work with adolescent girls, as he had to do what the 
ministry wanted him to do. We saw the contours of what we had been 
looking for, but it was not as clear a conflict as we had been expect-
ing. Pushing the issue even more, we were told about the dilemmas 
facing the ministry in trying to address problems specific to Liberia, 
but which were in conclict with international standards which empha-
sized the need for the government not to interfere.  
 
Leaving the ministry, we thought to ourselves that these Fellows 
seemed to be playing an important role to the ministries. We also felt 
somewhat vindicated in our belief that there was a conflict of interest 
between global agendas and local priorities. Maybe cisterns was one 
of the fields that had been left to its own devices. Mr. Blue had pro-
vided us with a list of other ministries who had Scott Fellows, but with 
no names. We decided to try the Ministry of Basins.  
The Maze of Local and Global Ownership 
Knocking on a random door in the Ministry of Basins, we were 
greeted by a somewhat puzzled young man named Mr. Orange. He 
was a Scott Fellow. 
 
Mr. Orange had thought about these issues before. Almost without 
hesitation he started on a long monologue, punctuated only by small 
breaks for opening the windows – which in addition to admitting out-
side air also had a tendency to let outside noise in as well. ‘Local 
ownership is difficult. Firstly, can the country identify its needs? Sec-
ondly, can donors understand these priorities, or do they impose their 
own?’ The example we discussed was the recently drafted Long-Term 
Plan. The process of writing the plan had taken ministry staff around 
the country to county meetings and consultations. Still, the question 
remained whether this plan was something the people want, or if it is 
something imposed by the UN. The plan had been drafted by the cen-
tral office of the ministry (‘with help from experts’), before ‘the peo-
ple’ had been given the chance to comment. The problem of course 
was that many Liberians are illiterate, so commenting on the plan 
made sense only if it could be simplified before circulating it at 
county-level meetings and consultations. In the end, Mr. Orange said, 
Local and National Ownership in Post-Conflict Liberia: Foreign and Domestic Inside Out?  15 
it was ‘very difficult to assess the extent of local vs. international con-
tent.’  
 
We pushed him on the track which we had left at the Ministry of Cis-
terns, hoping to get clear vindication of our thesis of international in-
terference in the work of the ministry. He replied that there was ‘no 
interference in terms of what to do in the ministry’. But then again, 
people in the ministry were not always able to get so involved in pro-
jects with outside funding. He therefore felt it was clearly expected of 
him to work as counterpart to international funders. 
 
Mr. Orange had a formal background in a relevant field, and therefore 
felt relatively at ease in his role, despite giving us the impression of 
not being quite sure as to what that role really was. Was it to be part of 
the ministry, we thought? Or was his main function that of a go-
between? 
 
We had noticed several international agency sections in the building, 
and wanted to understand more about the role of international experts 
in the ministries. What was their role, as opposed to that of the local 
staff? Our hunch was that if ministries were stuffed with international 
staff, could one really speak of local ownership in any meaningful 
way? International experts, Mr. Orange explained, ‘give technical 
support to the ministry’. What counts as technical support, and what 
distinguishes it from the substance of politics, we asked. Mr. Orange 
replied: ‘the key question, of course, talking about ownership, is 
whose agenda is it?’ While processes emphasizing local ownership 
generally rely on donor support, their legitimacy depends upon mean-
ingful political decision-making by national authorities. And, as we 
were told many a time, the capacity to control these processes is more 
often than not lacking.  
 
Our conversation took us back to the Long-Term Plan. What role had 
international experts played in its formulation? ‘The [plan of a similar 
country] had been previously written, and was used as a template’, we 
were told. An international organization working for another interna-
tional agency which worked closely with the Ministry had been re-
sponsible for the leg work. An expert from a liberal think tank had 
written one chapter. In the end, did the document capture what the 
minister wanted? ‘Yeah. To a large extent.’ We poked at the issue of 
technical support a bit more. What did it really refer to? ‘Work plan 
implementation, procurement, tender processes, budgeting, econo-
mists’… Mr. Orange paused. ‘Yeah. Technical support is a very broad 
catch-all.’ 
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One of the reason for this, we were told, was the extensive process of 
consultation. Mr. Orange told us that ‘Generally, they [the ministry] 
identify the need, and they get the technical help from us.’ ‘They’ re-
ferred to the ministry for which he was himself working, and ‘us’ to 
the international experts embedded in the ministry. Just as in our pre-
vious interview, there was some uneasiness about the boundaries of 
local and global involvement, about the distinction between us and 
them. Was Mr. Orange part of the ministry, or was he an international 
expert? Mr. Orange was obviously a bit weary of his role too: ‘There’s 
an attitude in this country that what the people have here is not good 
enough. And that’s not good. It shouldn’t be necessary to have people 
like me come and show people that they can.’ The problem, he ar-
gued, was that ‘So many departments have been neglected for so long 
that they don’t really feel that they have a stake anymore. What I want 
is for Liberia to own its process, and that there won’t be a need for 
people like me anymore.’ 
 
Talking to Mr. Orange, we got the clear impression that local owner-
ship was more an issue of rebranding global processes of governance 
than a reference to any meaningful process. Was it even conceivable 
to expect Liberian ministries to take the lead in the processes of recon-
struction the international community was engaged in, with all the bu-
reaucratic requirements, their own bureaucratic audit and budgeting 
languages? Was it a good idea to have young expat experts working 
for the ministries, or did it simply make it easier to push through a 
global liberal agenda at the local level? Did people like Mr. Orange 
empower the ministries, did they negotiate between national authori-
ties and the international community – or were they simply making 
the painful transition to a Western liberal democratic form of bureau-
cratic governance easier, faster, and more inevitable? 
A Deviation: In the Wrong Ministry? 
Our next conversation took place in the Ministry of Reservoirs. The 
person we were meeting was Mr. White who was now involved in co-
ordinating an international programme within the Ministry. The pro-
gramme was a long-term program implemented by the Government of 
Liberia through the Ministry of Reservoirs. It was supported by inter-
national donors and governments, and its budget administered by a 
UN agency. The maze did not seem to get any clearer.  
 
As he explained, the ministries have many programmes with interna-
tional donors. These programmes are funded outside the budget of 
ministries, but add up to the ministries’ budget line. Who was in 
charge of this programme, we wondered, who makes the decisions? A 
large part of his job, he told us, was to ‘keep the [international donors 
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and administrators] on top of stuff, but ultimately the ministry is in 
charge.’ These programmes between the government and the UN were 
based in many ministries and included a range of activities. Each of 
these programmes had a coordinator who, although based at the minis-
tries, was salaried through a UN organization (in fact, often had a UN 
business card with an address at one of the ministries) and reported to 
both the ministry and the UN. The idea behind these programmes, Mr. 
White told us, was to serve as a catalyst bringing actors together, and 
channelling funds towards areas that the government and the UN had 
prioritized for coordinated action.8 
 
During our conversation we learned that while these programmes 
seemed to have addressed the problem of channelling funds towards 
prioritized areas, they were problematic because they did not deal with 
the coordination problems between international actors and the gov-
ernment. The problem, we were told, was that ‘the UN knows more 
about what happens in the programmes than the government does.’ 
UN agencies are represented in the programmes, but those involved in 
doing the work on the ground were not involved in the meetings. That 
did not go for all the programmes, Mr. White added. In his own pro-
gram, the minister was ‘involved in every single question, including 
minutiae. The minister was the one who went out and said “we want 
this!”’  
 
As the minister seemed to be in full control of the program, we won-
dered, why is someone like Mr. White needed to coordinate the pro-
gramme? He replied, ‘the fact that they have me in this position is be-
cause of the onerous procurement process of the [international agen-
cies]. The Ministry knows a lot about the project, but ministers seldom 
have the time […] to make sure that the reporting is formatted accord-
ing to international standards.’ It suddenly occurred to us that the rea-
son why expats were needed in national ministries might not have 
anything to do with the fact that the ministries lacked the capacity to 
own the political process, but that they did not do it in the specific 
way the international community wanted them to do it. Mr. White as-
sured us that the ministry did have that capacity: ‘The ministry just did 
a policy thing. They did it all. All ministry. No international experts. 
The Minister of Reservoirs has this group of amazing people around 
that are just crazy awesome!’  
 
We got the impression that we were clearly being told that if we were 
looking for traces of international interference in local political proc-
esses, we had come to the wrong ministry. The Ministry of Recepta-
cles, we were told, was really the place to go. There, another US 
                                                 
8  For more on this, see http://www.unliberia.org/ 
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foundation had been working with them since the beginning, ‘embed-
ded on a really big scale.’  
Returning to Mr. Blonde 
We were not able to meet with anyone in the Ministry of Receptacles. 
Our next attempts at meeting with international experts in ministries 
were not particularly successful. This again goes to show the extent to 
which these experts become part of the environment they work in. We 
identified a few experts who never returned our calls, or were uncom-
fortable with talking about their role. When asking a Scott Fellow at 
the Ministry of Pools about local ownership, we were told that ‘I’m a 
corporate lawyer, so most of what I do isn’t relevant to your ques-
tions… You know… Well… It’s corporate law.’ Our only option left 
was to retrace our steps to where our investigation had started – the 
mysterious Mr. Blonde of the Ministry of Reservoirs a year earlier.  
 
Local ownership is not a straightforward issue, he told us. ‘The Libe-
rian government speaks of local ownership as anchoring in the coun-
ties, whereas the international community wants the Liberian minis-
tries to want the same as them.’ He gave a Liberian council as an ex-
ample of how local ownership should be understood and practised. 
Representatives for each county are elected as leaders, and whenever 
the Ministry of Reservoirs has a project or funding proposal, they dis-
cuss it with the local leadership structure. Then the monitoring of 
these projects is carried out in collaboration with local leaders. Mr. 
Blonde added: ‘those programmes are going exceptionally well.’ 
These people are accountable to each other, he explained: ‘they 
wouldn’t accept a project not in line with their needs.’ An idea which 
should have fallen within the remit of the Ministry of Basins, for in-
stance, came from the Ministry of Reservoirs through the local leader-
ship structure. It had been impossible to get the Ministry of Basins on 
board. 
 
But who decides what the ministries’ projects ought to be, we asked. 
He paused and looked at us: ‘The Minister of Reservoirs is [not new 
in the game] and probably sick of being told what to do.’ But this had 
not always been the case. ‘Initially, no one asked what the minister 
wanted to do. The ministry was a partner, but would just sign off. The 
minister felt that signing was required, otherwise money wouldn’t 
come to Liberia.’ There was a pause. As if to make the point even 
more forcefully, Mr. Blonde continued: ‘I have worked with the Min-
ister a while, and I know what the Minister would have said, so I can 
speak for the Minister.’ Slowly circling in on his role as a Scott Fel-
low, we started thinking that maybe these international fellows per-
formed some sort of a broker function between the national authorities 
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who were supposed to take the lead in political processes and did not 
always have the capacity, and an international community eager to 
spend money but not able to legitimize it in terms of national priori-
ties, not always knowing what was needed: ‘Often people lacked 
knowledge of specific processes, but they still needed to be con-
sulted.’ He continued: ‘I still had to sit down with this guy who had 
absolutely no idea of what this was actually about.’ 
 
We came back to ownership of policy processes. Mr. Blonde paused. 
‘The ministries don’t own the policies they produce… they don’t…’ 
He started by giving some examples. ‘The Ministry of Reservoirs 
have been trying to write an important strategy for a few years. The 
UN has supported this, hired consultants who worked closely with the 
ministry. But in the end the ministry was not ok with it. The spiel is 
gone to the counties, done the consulting with the population etc. but 
the Ministry can’t use anything.’ He told us how the ministry had 
wanted to produce a shorter, more ‘useable’ version. The UN agreed, 
but wanted to bring in the same consultant who had done the job in the 
first place. When the ministry refused to have the same consultant, the 
UN had said that they ‘refused to have someone else come in and redo 
all we’ve paid for.’ The UN was appalled by the fact that the ministry 
had gone ahead and passed the strategy. They complained that the 
ministry had done it without them, Mr. Blonde told us. The result was 
two different strategies: a full policy with no local ownership – which 
in effect remained in the drawer as it could not be used by the Minis-
try – and an abridged policy with local but no UN ownership – which 
was useful to the Ministry. Why couldn’t all the ministries just go 
ahead and produce national policies themselves? we wondered. The 
answer lay in the staffing of the ministries, Mr. Blonde explained. 
 
‘Below very intelligent and good ministers, there is no one qualified.’ 
International fellows and experts are therefore crucial, as they are 
‘able to help ministers speak the UN or partner language’. We were 
getting the same point as we had got from Mr. White previously. Na-
tional authorities may have had what it took to formulate policies, but 
there seemed to be a disconnect when the UN was the interlocutor, 
when things had to be written in UN, international agency or partner 
language. As Mr. Blonde explained, ‘Ministers have few people who 
can critique a proposal. The Scott Fellows break up huge documents, 
summarize them, make it possible to fulfil the duties of a minister.’ 
We felt we were coming close to what we were looking for. Might it 
be that the reporting procedures and bureaucratic processes of the UN 
and big NGOs simply do not take into account that there is no one 
trained in dealing with such processes in national ministries after a 
prolonged conflict? And are the demands placed upon national bu-
reaucracies by the international community unreasonable in light of 
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this? Mr. Blonde simply said: ‘It is impossible to be minister and your 
own technocrat.’ 
 
This was the space that the Scott Fellows were filling. For these Fel-
lows, qualified from top American universities and working alongside 
ministers, seem to provide the national authorities with a way for deal-
ing with the international community in its own language. The Fel-
lows were ‘100% government’, Mr. Blonde explained. ‘The UN hated 
me. ‘Cos I pushed against them. I gave the minister ammunition to 
back up what the Minister was fighting for.’ Local ownership, he ex-
plained, is not possible without expertise.’ He recognized the paradox: 
international fellows seemed to make local ownership possible; they 
seemed to enable it. The paradox was an uneasy one. What made it 
possible for such experts to work so closely with a minister was 
largely the fact that they were foreign. They were therefore not seen as 
a threat by the rest of the ministry. We were told of two Liberian for-
mer Scott Fellows who had been appointed deputy ministers. They 
were perceived as a threat by colleagues in the ministry.  
 
But the uneasy position was not only that of Liberian fellows who 
were neither entirely national nor entirely foreign. As Mr. Blonde ex-
plained, the UN and other expats would not consider him as a full-
fledged member of the ministry: ‘They would go straight to the Fel-
lows and ask for “shit” or dirty laundry on the ministry.’ Was it easier 
to talk to the Fellows because most of them were white, he wondered. 
Being by function part of the national political structure, and by virtue 
of being foreign a part of the international community, these Fellows – 
as we saw it – were daily in the impossible position of having to nego-
tiate the sovereign border.9 As we would discover, this was a distinc-
tion that constantly had to be renegotiated by international fellows 
employed by the international community to work for national au-
thorities. Winding up our conversation, we asked Mr. Blonde how, 
given the importance of fellows in ministries, one could rebuild minis-
tries to work in a self-sufficient manner. ‘Relying on the diaspora’, 
was his answer. We had come full circle. In order to have a meaning-
ful articulation of local ownership that the UN would listen to, local 
authorities had to rely on a foreign element.  
Ignoring the Local? 
The next morning we met with another Fellow, Mr. Pink, who worked 
for the Ministry of Containers. ‘As most projects are funded by inter-
national donors, is there ever going to be truly local ownership?’ he 
                                                 
9  On sovereignty and the border between inside/outside, see Bartelson 1995. Bartelson 
speaks of sovereignty as a parergon or frame which divides the picture (inside) from the 
wall (outside), while at the same time being a part of neither.  
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began to saying. We were in a coffee shop in central Monrovia, the 
‘only place you can get a decent coffee in the morning. Not espresso. 
Just coffee.’ He talked about a recent survey. Although the ministry 
had contributed with questions, it was the donor that determined the 
level of participation and the number of questions. 
 
We turned to the question of international consultants. Could one 
speak of local ownership in a meaningful way? ‘The bigger NGOs and 
UN agencies provide consultants to ministries. Their advice must be 
in line with the priorities of the agencies’, Mr. Pink answered. Again 
we returned to the issue of money. Ministries have little freedom, he 
explained, as UN agencies control the funds. ‘There is no real or full 
ownership of policies.’ He pushed the point even further, arguing that 
it was not likely that the UN would even allow ministries to develop 
local ownership if it ran counter to UN priorities.  
 
But then again, he said, ‘the concept of local ownership is so vague 
and kind of misleading. The idea is that the funding should be interna-
tional but the ideas generated locally. Local NGOs always draft re-
ports and file them to ministries. But the financial aspect compromises 
local participation. The policy formulated may not have too much lo-
cal ownership in the end.’ Here too it became clear that ministries suf-
fered from a lack of capacity. In the Ministry of Containers, UN agen-
cies had undertaken a capacity assessment report. The report had been 
initiated by the ministry itself, but UN agencies had been brought in. 
The report came out with one recommendation, he told us: to change 
the staff of the unit in the ministry, for the unit to carry out its work. 
One of his first tasks had been to find training for ministry staff. But 
the UN did not want to contribute. Unless the staff were changed, they 
would not provide training. 
 
But if local ownership is not what we find in national ministries, what 
should it be? ‘Local ownership at the most basic level means taking 
into account the realities of the country. The problem is that interna-
tional consultants don’t do that. They start with an assumption of in-
ternationally accepted universal standards can constantly refer to “in 
this country we did this, in that country we did that, etc.”’ The prob-
lem encountered in ministries, it seemed to us, was that when local 
participation is sought, it often seems to clash with international stan-
dards brought in by international experts. The funder wins. How do 
these priorities clash, we asked. ‘The UN has an issue with prioritiz-
ing. I am shocked at what they prioritize.’ In the face of the massive 
problems, UNMIL addresses symptoms rather than causes, he told us. 
‘The UN is interested in information and contributions to processes, 
but they don’t do anything about it.’ Local ownership we thought, 
rather than giving any meaningful contribution to the legitimacy of 
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peacebuilding efforts, seemed to be largely a matter of going through 
the motions. 
 
But what about his own position in the ministry, we asked. Did he not 
in some way represent those same international standards? ‘I’m here 
in a personal capacity, but the job is facilitated by a foundation – they 
expect me to do the job of my unit so that they can advertise it on their 
website – they don’t really expect me to work with local employees.’ 
Again, the issue of knowledge transfer and the problematic capacity-
building came up. There was little contact between Mr. Pink and na-
tional staff, and they did not seem very eager about learning. He felt 
this was due largely to the fact that many of them thought that the re-
sources brought in with fellows, like transport and internet, would dis-
appear again when the fellow left. 
‘Mr. Brown the White Guy’ 
We went back to the Ministry of Containers after lunch. We had never 
met Mr. Brown, and could therefore not describe him at the front en-
trance. Nor did we know which section he worked in. Nobody had 
heard of any Mr. Browns in the ministry, and it was not until someone 
shouted ‘Mr. Brown, the white guy?’ that we thought we might have a 
chance to finish our streak of interviews. The ‘white guy’ was indeed 
our Mr. Brown, and we moved to a dark bar nearby to talk. We had 
started off our conversation in one of the meeting rooms in the Minis-
try, but Mr. Brown was not comfortable talking about our topic when 
others in the Ministry could hear. 
 
It was difficult to get the interview going. Mr. Brown seemed scepti-
cal to our project, and we were tired of asking the same questions over 
and over. The problem with local ownership, as he saw it, was that 
while Liberians often wrote the policy to begin with, they had no ca-
pacity to take an idea and turn it into actual steps. If the Liberian Pov-
erty Reduction Strategy (PRS) had been written by Liberians, he said, 
it would have contained technical assistance to break things down into 
actual steps. ‘The problem is the PRS wasn’t written by Liberians.’ 
The problem with this is that the PRS is touted by all actors involved 
as the piece of local ownership par excellence. He told us he had spo-
ken to many internationals who take a lot of pride in their contribution 
to the PRS: ‘There’s definitely a lot of international ownership to it.’  
 
Why does the international community seem to multiply strategies for 
anything? ‘It’s always easier to write a new strategy than to imple-
ment an existing one.’ But are the policies favoured by the interna-
tional community flawed, we asked. ‘I don’t think they’re flawed, be-
cause they come from the same Western educational system that I 
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come from.’ But there he was, working for the Liberian Ministry of 
Containers. ‘The UN has a “false consciousness thing” about Liberi-
ans. The UN assumes that if they only understood how the [Western 
standards] work, that’s what they would want.’  
 
There was a certain bitterness to what he said, and that surprised us at 
first. Did that come from the fact that he had to work in the Ministry 
to solve the issues NGOs could just criticize? ‘It’s easy for INGOs to 
say that [certain issues are a violation of international standards]’, he 
said. ‘They don’t have to deal with the [actual problems].’ We started 
talking about his role as a non-Liberian working for the Ministry of 
Containers: ‘I’d rather be working for the US government’ he said. ‘I 
don’t mean to say “work for the US Ministry of Containers”, but if 
I’m to advise as an outsider, I’d rather be explicit about it. Many tech-
nical issues have political repercussions, and I think it’d be easier to 
be explicitly out of that.’  
 
As a way of ensuring local ownership and capacity-building, many 
international fellows worked with a Liberian counterpart. In the past, 
ministers had come to rely heavily on Scott Fellows (‘who knew eve-
rything about the ministry’) only to find that their knowledge vanished 
when their time was up. ‘I now have a Liberian counterpart on every-
thing’, Mr. Brown told us. The Liberian counterpart, we understood, 
was useful in terms of identifying protocol issues. Asked about how 
the cooperation was going, he replied ‘the ideas are mine, the work 
plan is mine; the Liberian person could not be more disinterested.’ But 
the issue, Mr. Brown explained, was not just one of ‘Liberians vs. 
non-Liberians.’ Again, the conversation brought us over to the Libe-
rian diaspora – the so-called ‘re-pats’ – who have become more in-
volved in Liberian ministries. ‘They’re ideal’, he opined. Not only did 
they ‘get’ the politics, but they seem ‘less timid about telling people 
that things should be different.’ It was clear to us that Mr. Brown ex-
perienced a certain unease about passing judgement on how things 
should or should not be done, and was afraid of being more a repre-
sentative of a Western governing logic rather than a staff in the Libe-
rian ministry: ‘They don’t agonize – like I do –about whether or not 
they dilute local ownership. ‘Cos everything is “cultural”. But some-
times things aren’t cultural; they’re just inefficient!’ 
 
Our conversation had taken a turn, bringing us straight to the heart of 
the matter: ‘I act like I’m part of the ministry, but I’m nooot part of 
the ministry.’ For instance, he recalled, a meeting where the seating 
was arranged so that ministry people would sit together in the middle: 
‘I was placed at a table for ministry people in a meeting, but that 
wasn’t right. Other [Scott] Fellows were placed there too, but they 
were Liberians. But at the same time I would have felt slightly out of 
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place sitting in another place, ‘cos I’m not a donor either.’ He contin-
ued: ‘It’s weird, because a lot of donors will come to me to have ac-
cess to the minister, because they assume that I’ll be more sympathetic 
to them than others in the ministry – which I am because they make 
sense to me – gosh..! I’d rather work for USAID.’ We continued talk-
ing about his role as both outsider and insider: ‘Sometimes we make 
things more complicated and difficult than they are, by thinking too 
much about the issues. This intern who was here for three months im-
proved things a lot, ‘cos he just went in and told them how things 
could be more efficient.’ We were nearing the close of our conversa-
tion, as the bar was starting to fill up. We asked him if he ever felt part 
of the ministry, or if he always felt like an outsider: ‘The only time I 
feel like I’m part of the ministry 100% is when NGOs ask me to do 
stuff that the minister should sign off on; when expats try to take ad-
vantage of my position assuming, that I’ll be more on their side by 
virtue of being Western.’ He told us how difficult it had been when 
the Minister had once accused him of siding with an NGO. Why, we 
asked, was his advice important to a Liberian minister, as opposed to 
the advice from other international experts? ‘It might be a relief for 
the Minister to have an international who is not part of politics, so that 
the Minister can rely on the technical advice.’ Our ‘white guy’ then 
returned to his ministry.  
Conclusion: The Locus of the Local 
In terms of understanding the meanings of local ownership, and the 
conditions for the possibility of a meaningful national political proc-
ess, our conversations with the Fellows took us to the heart of the mat-
ter, to the site where the distinction between inside and outside was 
being articulated, written and rewritten. The inside/outside distinction 
reified in the International Relations scholarship, making what is in-
side ipso facto a part of national or local politics and the outside the 
sphere of global politics, cannot grasp the processes of articulations of 
sovereign politics and global governance that take place every day in 
post-conflict countries.10 It relies on the distinction being fixed. But 
this distinction must be reinforced and rewritten continuously by plac-
ing insiders at one table and outsiders at another. Through our rendi-
tion of some of the conversations we had over the course of a week in 
Monrovia, we have tried to show the extent to which go-betweens like 
the Scott Fellows are crucial to upholding these practices of demarca-
tion of boundaries. Through their function as insiders by virtue of their 
position, they confirm in practice the distinction. When they work in 
the ministry, they are no longer supposed to be ‘international’, and the 
ministries are thereby taken to have inherent qualities of local owner-
ship.  
                                                 
10  See Andersen and Sending 2010. 
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Our conversations also brought out another important element: that 
the conditions for the possibility of a meaningful local or national po-
litical process may lie not in where that process takes place, but in 
how. Local ownership over a political process involving interactions 
between a country devastated by civil war on the one hand, and the 
well-oiled large-scale bureaucracies embodying the international 
community on the other, can be meaningful only if the distinction be-
tween these two is porous. Local ownership depends not on the dis-
tinction between local and global being fixed, but on how porous that 
boundary is. The central role played by the Scott Fellows in Liberian 
ministries is not one of intermediaries. They help translate contexts, be 
they bureaucratic or cultural. As we were told by Nice Guy Eddie, 
‘they are able to translate questions – it’s not like we have dumb min-
isters or anything, but they help the minister respond in a way that is 
in the best interests of our country.’ 
 
Implementation of peacekeeping processes is increasingly sought 
grounded in what is presented as local ownership. Such a focus, it is 
usually argued, is necessary for the legitimacy of both the policies be-
ing implemented as well as the UN peacekeeping endeavour in gen-
eral. It is also seen as crucial to the sustainability of these processes. 
However, as we have tried to show in the present paper, while the dif-
ficulties pertaining to local ownership may not be easily solved at the 
policy level, they have to be dealt with – as indeed they routinely are – 
in implementation practices. The central point to emphasize in this 
negotiation is the role played by different contexts. Training pro-
grammes aimed at sensitizing to the difficulties of local ownership 
should therefore to a greater extent take their starting point in prac-
tices and different contextualizations. 
 
While peacekeeping is inherently the meeting place of different stake-
holders with different interests and identities, an emphasis on where 
people come from and who they are may not be the solution to over-
coming the dilemmas of local ownership. When stakeholders repre-
senting different agendas are brought together in specific contexts and 
settings, the central question – as we have brought to the fore with re-
spect to the Scott Fellows – is not necessarily who you are, but whose 
perspectives guide your work. In the fragile post-conflict settings in 
which peacekeeping operations work, deliberate reflection on this per-
spective may be particularly important, since the truly local perspec-
tives cannot yet be voiced through the intricate institutionalized 
mechanisms of the UN peacekeeping machinery. 
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